"desire to conform with the general principle of respect for the civilian population."
22 Article 57's Commmentary, unsurprisingly, echoes these concerns. Acknowledging that the terms of article 57 are "relatively imprecise and are open to a fairly broad margin of judgment," 23 it puts great trust in both good faith and common sense as interpretative tools, although it fails to define the substance of either of these concepts as a matter of law.
24
The academic literature is largely in agreement with this acknowledgment of the question-begging nature of the proportionality balancing test under international humanitarian law. Schmitt, for example, states about the principle of proportionality that "there is no question that [it] . . .is among the most difficult of LOIAC norms to apply." 25 Rogers, noting that proportionality is "more easily stated than applied in practice," 26 stresses that greater care to minimize potential risks to civilians may actually expose attacking forces to increased risks of harm. 27 How is balancing to be done in this context, and to be done Court (ICC)? 32 Other questions, of course, could also be asked, but like these, they do not admit of easy answers. 33 The
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Final Report), which
was released in 2000, attempted to provide some general parameters to these and other questions related to the proportionality balancing test. 34 It did this by collapsing the heavy burden of decision making on the shoulders of the "'reasonable military commander.'" 35 At the same time, however, it acknowledged that the decision maker's values, background, education, and combat experience will likely influence what can conceivably be considered excessive, or less than, or perhaps even just not quite, excessive. 36 As Dinstein notes, particular facts and circumstances will also play an important role in these determinations. 37 It is precisely the absence of what Schmitt calls a "common currency of evaluation" 38 that makes the task of the "reasonable military commander" so difficult, and so legally inconclusive. As Kalshoven suggests, what is at issue is an "agonizing dilemma in which the law cannot provide a clear-cut answer." 39 A committed pacifist and an "ends justifies the means" militarist may both argue their cases using the language of the proportionality balancing test, referring to good faith and other interpretative tools in so doing, but it is scarcely believable that they will reach the same legal conclusions. To contend otherwise is to wish for an objectivity, certainty, and integrity in the law related to proportionality that simply does not exist. 40 Practice: Operation Cast Lead
If the language of the proportionality balancing test as such, assisted by whatever interpretative tools one might wish to bring to bear on the matter, such as a sense of humanity, good faith, common sense, or a combination of these interpretative tools or perhaps even others, does not, and cannot, of itself bring a tangible clarity to the proportionality principle as a matter of law, then perhaps an examination that shifts the discussion from theory to practice will be more satisfying.
Perhaps the lawyerly tendency to analyze to excess, to argue for argument's sake, problematizes proportionality in theory but does not hold up in practice, where there might actually exist a common understanding of the principle. A look at the largely negative international reaction to Israel's actions in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead, however, suggests that the proportionality principle's theoretical shortcomings are only exacerbated in practice.
This section exposes some of these practical shortcomings by separately looking at how different actors, both state and non-state, have grappled with the substance of proportionality in the context of Operation Cast Lead and, just as importantly, at the process through which these discussions have taken place. As regards the latter, particular attention is given to the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (Fact-Finding Mission).
The Substance of Proportionality
Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in a particular context. That context involved hudnas, or ceasefires, with Hamas that had given the group tactical advantages when it had been militarily weak and opportunities to regroup, opportunities that had effectively allowed it to fight, and to fight more effectively, another day. 41 The years immediately prior to Operation Cast Lead, of course, had seen Israel's disengagement from Gaza, the election of 57 Words such as "proportionality" and "excessive" were frequently bandied about as emotional crutches, and one did not get the sense that the legal nature of these terms was either known or appreciated. 58 The title of an opinion piece published on January 11, 2009, in
London's Sunday Times by over two dozen prominent, mostly United Kingdom-based international lawyers typified the mood: "Israel's Bombardment of Gaza is Not SelfDefence-It's a War Crime" ("Israel's Bombardment").
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In their seeming adjudications of the law proprio motu, however, it is unclear exactly how these international organizations, states, and members of civil society arrived at their apparently so conclusive judgments that Israel's actions during Operation Cast Lead had so obviously violated the substance of proportionality as such. Even when they seemed cognizant of the fact that the legal balancing test for proportionality applies in both international and non-international armed conflicts and that it does so as a matter of both international treaty law and customary international law, these actors hardly hesitated to conclude that the attacks at issue were disproportionate rather than, for example, less than, or perhaps even just not quite, disproportionate. In other words, there was little qualification, and more than a hint of what Kennedy calls "self-confident outrage." 60 Where had proportionality's inherent flexibility and ambiguity gone? Had they been concealed for the sake of more convincing and powerful argument, for the sake of "the cause"?
A cynical, though perhaps not inaccurate, explanation might be that "disproportionate attacks" are simply those that emanate from parties to conflicts that particular "namers" and "shamers" do not want to "win," regardless of the largely indeterminate and complex balancing between civilian and military considerations that the proportionality principle formally requires as a matter of law. 61 As Walzer notes, Operation Cast Lead "was called 'disproportionate' on day one, before anyone knew very much about how many people had been killed or who they were." 62 While the use of legal language for political purposes cannot, and should not, be discounted and undoubtedly explains some of the largely negative international reaction to Operation Cast Lead, as does the fact that it was a Jewish state, indeed, the Jewish state, that was in the dock in the court of world public opinion, another explanation seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the substance of the proportionality principle itself, the idea that it somehow prohibits "extensive" collateral damage as a matter of law. 63 In fact, many of the criticisms of Operation Cast Lead that based themselves in (dis)proportionality expressly made their claims in ways that seemed to have assimilated, in error, "excessive" with "extensive." 64 To give a few examples, consider that Chairperson Jahangir "call[ed] on all parties to immediately cease all actions that result in civilian casualties, or put them at great risk."
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Special Rapporteur Falk lamented "extensive" civilian casualties and "extensive" damage to both public and private property in Gaza. 66 In its discussion of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks in the context of war crimes, No Safe Place decried, and thus presumably sought to make of legal relevance, "massive destruction" that had taken place to Gazan hospitals, mosques, private homes, schools, government buildings, businesses and factories, United Nations facilities, and farmland. 67 These discussions seem to imply that international humanitarian law gives dispositive weight to "extensive" damage, particularly to civilian objects and to civilians themselves but perhaps not even exclusively to them, in assessments of proportionality.
The legal test for (dis)proportionate attacks, however, focuses only on those attacks which "may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." What may be "excessive" need not be, though it may be, "extensive," and what may be "extensive" may be, though it need not be, "excessive." In fact, to suggest that proportionate attacks must necessarily avoid extensive damage in addition to the already-existing positive law obligation to avoid excessive damage risks effectively subjecting parties to an armed conflict to tying not one but both of their hands behind their backs. 68 Indeed, international humanitarian law in general and the principle of proportionality in particular are the great facilitators of death and destruction in armed conflict, "extensive" or otherwise. Put differently, as long as the casualties at issue can "fit" and be "argued within" the formal constraints of law, there will be no violation of law. What is at issue is a discourse of blood sacrifice, since "the rule opens latitude for non-excessive civilian casualties and merely prohibits attacks that are likely to exceed its imagined limit. This latitude is where sacrifice occurs-beyond this, it is murder." 70 According to an article published in the Jerusalem Post, the preliminary findings of a study by the Israel Defense Force (IDF)'s Gaza Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA) concluded that there were 1,338 Palestinian fatalities during Operation Cast Lead, and of the over 1,200 of these whose identities had been positively identified, 880 had been classified as either combatants or non-combatants. 80 Of these 880 Palestinian fatalities, furthermore, there were approximately two combatants killed for every non-combatant killed, "the reverse of the impression created by Palestinian officials during the conflict, and a world away from the Hamas claim that just 48 of its fighters were killed." 84 These methodically combed through various Palestinian websites and cross-referenced casualties with organizational affiliations. Through a statistical analysis, it was concluded that "at least 63% to 75% of the Palestinians killed in Operation Cast Lead appear to have been specifically targeted, combat-aged males." How is international law to respond in this uncertain environment? Indeed, how should it? Given the "fog of war" and the fact that accusations have been made against Israel for its actions during Operation Cast Lead that were later proven to be false, the most famous of these being that the IDF had attacked a United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East school in the Jabaliya refugee camp in Gaza, 89 prudence might suggest taking all of these figures with a "grain of salt." This is particularly the case given what Dershowitz calls the "'continuum of civilianality,'" the fact that "'civilianality' is often a matter of degree, rather than a bright line." Lead, the urban spaces of Gaza became its fighting spaces, with the attendant intermingling of civilians and combatants in close quarters. 92 Civilian residences were taken over and used by Palestinian forces for tactical military advantage, for attacking the IDF and as weapons depots, 93 and mosques were used for military purposes that included the storage of Kalashnikov assault rifles, improvised explosive devices, Qassam rockets, an anti-aircraft gun, and ammunition. 94 Even a zoo in Gaza was found to have been used during Operation
Cast Lead to store a rocket propelled grenade and light arms. 95 It is this strategy that proportionality has "created a large space for third-party decision making and has become a staple in second-opinion discourse, whether in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, or in the forums of politics and public opinion." 98 He goes on to argue that the ability of these discussions to actually affect the actions or omissions of relevant actors will partly depend upon the credibility of the process through which these discussions take place. 99 Related to this is the oft-cited legal maxim that "justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done."
Unfortunately, the probably most high-profile international investigation of Operation Cast Lead from the standpoint of international humanitarian law, the Fact-Finding Mission, suffered from a number of significant "process" flaws, and these flaws seriously cut against Consider that Justice Goldstone had in the past sat on the Board of Directors of
Human Rights Watch, a human rights non-governmental organization that has itself "thrown its hat in the ring" on Operation Cast Lead. 115 Goldstone had also, along with Colonel Travers, Jilani, and others, signed a letter, "Find the Truth About the Gaza War," in which they had advocated for an "international investigation of gross violations of the laws of war, committed by all parties to the Gaza conflict." 116 Chinkin, as a signatory to "Israel's Bombardment," had effectively argued and legally concluded, as early as , that Operation Cast Lead had violated the law related to the use of force and that Israel had committed an act of aggression in Gaza. 117 The full title of that opinion piece, to repeat it again, is revealing: "Israel's Bombardment of Gaza is Not Self-Defence-It's a War Crime."
Admittedly, some of these cases are stronger than others, but taken together, they are very troubling indeed. 118 Given these and other serious "process" flaws associated with the Fact-Finding
Mission, it is difficult to lend much credibility to the Gaza Report. While a critical evaluation of its substance lies outside the scope of this chapter, suffice it to say that its hostile conclusions as regards Israel were as wholly to be expected as its findings that Israel had violated the principle of proportionality under international humanitarian law were unsurprising. 119 The Gaza Report was rocket fuel for the Hamas propaganda machine. 
